Hobbes is usually considered a pioneer in the modern study of laughter. This reputation is not fully deserved, as many of the elements of his analysis can be found in the discussions of his predecessors. Yet, Hobbes is no doubt the first to give a systematic account of laughter, an explanation which is inherently connected with his general theory of human nature and interests.
The analysis of laughter is part of Hobbes's doctrine of the emotions (or "passions"). This may seem odd, for laughter is often treated as a typically intellectual and "rational" response, completely devoid of emotional involvement.5 Moreover, it is not clear why laughter should be given such detailed attention within a relatively poor and scanty theory of emotions (compared with those of Hobbes's contemporaries, Descartes and Spinoza). There are, I believe, two reasons for Hobbes's choice in laying stress on the concept of laughter.
(i) The metaphysical-methodological reason. Laughter is an expression of a passion that distinctly exemplifies Hobbes's general theory concerning the origin, identity, and classification of the emotions; it also exemplifies the materialistic assumption which reductively connects emotions as mental phenomena with their physical source, on the one hand, and their bodily manifestation, on the other.
(ii) The psychological-moral reason. Laughter is an emotion whose analysis typically reflects the general Hobbesian conception of man's nature as a social creature: the ceaseless competition for positions of power, the unrelenting struggle for self-preservation, and the purely egoistic nature of man, who continuously strives for superiority over others.
II. Hobbes discusses laughter in two places: in chapter 9 of Human in the latter is shorter, there are no significant differences between the two versions. In both cases the context of inquiry is the theory of passions, although Hobbes clearly states that laughter itself is not a passion but only "the sign" or the bodily manifestation of a certain passion. This passion has no name in ordinary language, and Hobbes refers to it by the term "glory," which connotes the feeling of superiority, pride, and self-assertion. This emotion of "glory" consists of the recognition of one's power, preeminent abilities and advantageous position in relation to others. Hence, it "is always joy."7
According to Hobbes, there are various situations which typically give rise to this feeling of glory: (a) success in one's own actions beyond one's expectations; (b) the perception of infirmities and defects in others; (c) the perception of infirmities and defects in one's own past (as long as they do not carry any "present dishonour"); (d) the conception of some absurdity abstracted from individual persons. The laughter evoked by these types of circumstances is, according to Hobbes, always connected with feelings of superiority, "the imagination of our own odds and eminency." Such aware- It is important to note that Hobbes's superiority theory of laughter completely dissociates laughter from its most apparent source, the comic ("wit" and "jest"): "for men laugh at mischances and indecencies wherein there lieth no wit or jest at all." And when we do laugh at jests, the absurdity which makes the jest laughable is always and necessarily connected with the imagination of "our odds and eminency." We might further support Hobbes's statement by noting that there are also comic situations which do not excite the particular response of laughter at all (such as subtle irony, or a funny event experienced in solitude).
However, not every state of "glory" takes the form of laughter. Only when the passion of glory is occasioned suddenly by an unexpected or unforeseen condition can laughter occur. We may now quote Hobbes's final definition of laughter: "[t]he passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly."
Having defined laughter and the conditions of its inducement, Hobbes proceeds to evaluate it. Much laughter is a sign of pusillanimity, says Hobbes. For it is characteristic of people who "are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves" and cannot achieve self-assurance but through the observation of the defects of others. Great minds compare themselves only with people of their own kind, which seems to imply that they do not laugh much.9 Hobbes refers, however, to one kind of laughter which may suit also higher minds: laughter "at absurdities and infirmities abstracted from persons"; this is a non-offensive type of laughter. Its impersonal nature neutralizes the element of scorn and derision that is essential to the other types of laughter. We might add that laughter at oneself is also legitimized by Hobbes for the same reason, although the laughter of self-irony is not explicitly mentioned by Hobbes.
The empirical evidence which Hobbes offers in support of his superiority definition of laughter is very meager. He draws attention to two facts: first, that no one likes to be laughed at; secondly, that laughing to oneself in company makes all others feel jealous and uneasy (for everyone suspects that he is the object of scorn). But as we shall see in the sequel, Hobbes's main argument for his definition is theoretical rather than empirical.
III. Hobbes's definition of laughter is rooted in the traditional discussions of the subject, his own claim to originality notwithstanding. When he says "but what joy, . . . and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any," he is ignoring a long list of philosophers with whom he was definitely familiar.
In Plato's Philebus (48-50)10 Hobbes could have found an explanation of 8 Although Hobbes does not mention the laughter of giggling girls, which appears not to be aroused by comparison with an inferior person, his superiority thesis applies to this case as well. For such laughter reflects self-assurance and supremacy over others who by hypothetical comparison are despised.
9 Leviathan, 46.
laughter in terms of superiority. Socrates cites laughter as a typical example of "mixed feelings," i.e., experiences of simultaneous pleasure and pain. The object of laughter-the ridiculous or comic person-is inferior to the laugher in the epistemological sense of "not knowing oneself." But such ignorance can, according to Socrates, be taken as ridiculous only if it is "powerless" and harmless to others. Now, laughter itself is pleasant, but owing to its special kind of objects it is always accompanied by envy or Schadenfreude, which is painful. So, as in Hobbes, laughter is a typical response to the misfortunes of others. The difference is that Plato interprets "misfortunes" on a purely epistemological level (unjustified self-conceit), while Hobbes is concerned with a wider spectrum of inferior characteristics and defects (and ascribes the unjustified self-conceit, "vain glory", to the laugher). InLaws (935)11 Plato distinguishes, like Hobbes, between offensive and non-offensive laughter, invoking the same Hobbesian criterion of personal scorn vs. innocent impersonal humor. Aristotle's short comment on comedy (Poetics 1449a)12 has become the locus classicus for those interested in the subject of laughter. Hobbes no doubt knew this passage, but probably could not acknowledge its impact on his views because of his general aversion to Aristotelianism. Aristotle follows Plato in identifying the object of laughter as the harmlessly ridiculous, but parts company with him in replacing the epistemological defect of ignorance by the aesthetic category of deformity or ugliness as the genus of the ridiculous. The object of laughter may be "men worse than the average" or the mask that "is something ugly and distorted without causing pain." Again, although Hobbes understands the superiority of the laugher in a much wider sense than the aesthetic and quasi-moral sense of Aristotle, the seeds of the superiority theory are definitely Greek. It should however be remembered that while Aristotle as an aesthetician is interested only in the analysis of the laughter-raising object (the comic), Hobbes as a psychologist is concerned only with the laughing subject and with the function of laughter in human behavior. Nevertheless, the inferiority of the object of laughter in Aristotle and the superiority of the laugher in Hobbes suggest a similar subject-object relation.
The superiority factor in the analysis of laughter was also given a rhetorical sense. Aristotle in his Rhetoric (1419b)13 briefly mentions jests, which are "of some service in controversy" (e.g. in destroying one's opponent's earnestness). Cicero elaborates the idea of laughter as a means of attaining rhetorical advantage;
... it shatters or obstructs or makes light of an opponent, or alarms or repulses him; and it shows the orator himself to be a man of finish, accomplishment and taste.14 Note however that in this sense laughter is a means for the achievement of superior position, whereas in Hobbes's analysis laughter is an expression or an effect of a feeling of supremacy. Bacon, whose general impact on Hobbes was considerable, emphasizes the intellectual source of laughter and says "that laughing is scarce, properly, a passion". "The conceit of somewhat ridiculous" which precedes laughter is a cognitive rather than an emotional attitude.15 As we shall see, Hobbes follows Bacon in considering the cognitive elements of laughter no less than the dynamic-emotional ones. Hobbes also learnt from Bacon that laughter must be effected by a sudden and unexpected change in our mental life, and also that it is accompanied by delight and joy. Bacon also presents a psychophysical explanation which connects the spiritual grounds of laughter with the details of its bodily manifestation.
In 1649 , 1973), I, 385-86, sees. 124, 125, 126 It should however be noted that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary motion is problematic in a mechanistic theory such as Hobbes's, and it is therefore not clear how imagination can serve as the starting point of the interior voluntary motions (the emotions). Hobbes regards imagination as "nothing but decaying sense,"20 i.e., a remnant of the operation of external bodies on our senses (and brain), an operation which is not subject to our willpower and lies beyond our control. Indeed, laughter was traditionally considered by most theoreticians as a typically involuntary response-not dissimilar to sneezing. It seems that the solution to this problem must lie in Hobbes's analysis of the concept of will. The will is "the last appetite, or aversion [in deliberation] immediately adhering to the action or the omission thereof."21 And a voluntary act is thus "that, which proceedeth from the will, and no other." In this deterministic sense, actions that have their beginning in ambition, lust, and fear are voluntary, and so is the burst of laughter whose beginning is in sudden glory. Only vital motions are, strictly speaking, involuntary since they involve no deliberation whatsoever, that is to say, no appetite or aversion.
Hobbes's theory of passions assumes two methods of identifying passions or emotions, taking desire as the starting point, which may be analyzed as follows: (i) the regressive method: the attempt to examine the passion in reverse-from desire to conception in the imagination which created it (or in Hobbes's terminology "from what conception proceeds everyone of those passions"); (ii) the progressive method: the attempt to identify the passion through its external manifestation, the transformation of the invisible micromotion in the brain into the macro-motion, which is accessible to ordinary sense perception and empirical observation.
Bacon and Descartes follow the second method; but Hobbes tries the first method, which requires introspection and is sustained by assumptions that are not behavioristically verifiable. Surprisingly, Hobbes, the materialist, does not investigate in detail the behavioral expression of the emotion of "glory," although it seems that he would have accepted Bacon's and Descartes's descriptions in this matter. One possible explanation for this methodological choice is that, for reasons related to his general philosophical and political purpose, Hobbes is primarily interested in the psychological aspects of human behavior, i.e., in the conception of the imagination which gives rise to the emotions. This will be our concern in the next section.
V. Hobbes's entire psychology is founded on the assumption of human egocentricity, man's natural aspiration for self-preservation, the constant competition from birth to death for power-one aspect of which is social recognition. Hobbes's superiority theory of laughter suits this theoretical framework. Laughter reflects a feeling of power which may be directed either at the laughing subject himself, or at another person, or at abstract human properties and characteristics.
Yet, Hobbes's attitude towards that feeling of triumph called 'glory' is ambiguous, and accordingly his evaluation of laughter is ambivalent. On the one hand, Hobbes is a naturalist, who regards every form of struggle for self-preservation and power as a legitimate strife which in itself cannot be subject to moral judgment. And laughter as an attempt to attain superiority by deprecating others is no exception to that rule. On the other hand, he is highly critical of those who laugh excessively at others: "much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of pusillanimity." Great minds compare themselves only with the most able.
In order to elucidate this ambivalence we may try to reconstruct some arguments which Hobbes does not state explicitly. That sudden glory which is the passion of laughter is a special case of glory in general. Hobbes distinguishes between three sorts of glory: just or well-grounded glory, false glory, and vain glory.22 Just glory is based on the consciousness of one's own power justified by past actions, and giving rise to pride. Such an experience of one's own power is also projected to the future and serves as a basis for the aspiration to a further increase in power. False glory proceeds from "fame and trust of others, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived." Aspiration based on this kind of glory is bound to fail. Lastly, vain glory is created by imagination ("fiction") of actions done by one which in fact were never done by him. The ego is puffed with pride which has no foundation in reality. Vain glory cannot therefore produce any aspiration or appetite. As examples of vain glory Hobbes mentions our identification with the heroes of romance or with agents of actions we admire. Hobbes's list of signs of vain glory is fairly long (imitation, counterfeiting, etc.), but strangely does not include laughter.
Nevertheless, although Hobbes does not expressly say so,23 it seems that the sudden glory in laughter should be understood as vain glory. For, firstly, it cannot be just glory, since those who enjoy self-confidence, "the great minds", do not need to resort to laughter. Their self-assurance is genuinely confirmed by their own deeds and does not require comparisons with weaker people. Secondly, the sudden glory that makes us laugh is not false glory either, because laughter is not dependent on the image of the subject in the eyes of others. To put it succinctly, being produced by something we find in ourselves, laughter cannot be the expression of false glory; being produced nevertheless by comparison with inferior persons, laughter cannot be related to just glory.
If we construe the sudden glory of laughter as vain glory, not only can we solve the problem of Hobbes's ambivalent attitude to laughter, but we will also be able to understand why laughter is not exactly an emotion. For vain glory is not expressed in any aspiration or appetite whatsoever; it is void or "unprofitable" in the sense that it does not lead to any (animal) motion. Its bodily manifestation is a motion that is futile par excellence; it consists of neither appetite (moving towards) nor aversion (moving away). Accordingly, the description of laughter as arising from the futile and immobile state of vain glory can be satisfactorily integrated with Hobbes's definition of contempt, which is a most important factor in his conception of laughter: "Contempt [is] nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things." The things we despise are neither loved nor hated, i.e., are emotionally indifferent to us. This, incidentally, is also Descartes's view: in the case of derision or scorn an emotional equilibrium (and hence "immobility") is guaranteed by the admixture of some hatred (of "small evils") with some joy (derived from the evil being deserved by the derided person).24 In the case of "bantering" no hate or joy is involved, and hence it is not a passion at all but rather an indication of the tranquillity of the virtuous soul. 25 Naturally Hobbes does not leave room for "bantering" in the Cartesian sense, and his "laughter without offense" is still an expression of superiority.
Laughter therefore holds an extraordinary position among the emotions. It is a behavioral phenomenon which indeed has an emotional correlate ("glory"), but a sterile and void one ("vain-glory"). So although laughter forms part of the theory of the emotions, it is not an ordinary emotion: although sudden glory is an emotion in its original etymological sense of 23 Except for the last sentence of the section on laughter in Human Nature (47), which associates laughter (at least of a certain type) with vain glory. 24 Passions of the Soul, 413, sec. 178. 25 bid., 413, sec. 180. Cf. Bergson, Laughter, 4: "Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion."
